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ABSTRACT 
 
Do bad role models exonerate others’ unethical behavior? Based on social learning theory and psychological theories of 
blame, we predicted that unethical behavior by higher-ranking individuals changes how people respond to lower-ranking 
individuals who subsequently commit the same transgression. Five studies explored when and why this rank-dependent 
imitation effect occurs. Across all five studies, we found that people were less punitive when low-ranking transgressors 
imitated high-ranking members of their organization. However, imitation only reduced punishment when the two transgressors 
were from the same organization (Study 2), when the transgressions were highly similar (Study 3), and when it was unclear 
whether the initial transgressor was punished (Study 5). Results also indicated that imitation affects punishment because it 
influences whom people blame for the transgression. These findings reveal actor-observer differences in social learning and 
identify a way that unethical behavior spreads through organizations. 
 
 
Major scandals caused by corporate executives receive a 
great deal of attention from the media and scholars alike, but 
the aggregated cost of relatively minor transgressions 
committed by the average employee is substantial. Asset 
misappropriations, such as expense report manipulation and 
inventory theft, are by far the most common type of fraud 
within organizations (Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners, 2014). Expense report fraud alone costs 
companies in the United States $1 billion annually (J.P. 
Morgan Chase, 2011). Employee theft of retail goods causes 
$15.1 billion in lost revenue, which is a larger loss than is 
caused by shoplifting (National Retail Federation, 2012). 
Tips from employees remain the most effective means of 
detecting these types of fraud (Association of Fraud 
Examiners, 2014; see also Weaver, Treviño, & Cochran, 
1999). However, employees also can create and maintain a 
culture that “normalizes” bad behavior. For example, it is an 
open secret in some organizations that employees pad their 
expense reports by ten percent or more (Strout, 2001). 
Currently, it is poorly understood how people come to 
tolerate unethical behavior in some instances more than in 
others. What increases the likelihood that people will look the 
other way rather than punish those who violate the rules? 
Behavioral ethics research has tended to examine ethical 
transgressions as isolated, one-off occurrences, rather than in 
relation to other transgressions that have occurred within the 
organization (Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & Treviño, 2008; 
Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2010; Moore, 2009). Recent work, 
however, has begun to focus on how bad behavior propagates 
through organizations by exploring social contagion as a 
contributor to abusive supervision (Brown, Treviño, & 
Harrison, 2005; Mawritz, Mayer, Hoobler, Wayne, & 
Marinova, 2012), anti-social employee behavior (Mayer, 
Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2010; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 
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1998), levels of deviance across workgroups (Mayer, Kuenzi, 
Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 2009), collective acts of 
corruption that benefit the organization (Smith-Crowe & 
Warren, 2014), as well as exemplary behaviors (Brown et al., 
2005; Mayer, Nurmohamed, Treviño, Shapiro, & Schminke, 
2013; Schaubroeck et al., 2012). Placing greater emphasis on 
understanding the connections among unethical behaviors 
enacted by different people within organizations as they 
unfold over time has identified important processes that are 
often underspecified in models of individual ethical decision 
making.  
In the spirit of this emerging area of research, we 
examine how prior instances of unethical behavior change 
how people evaluate subsequent transgressions and punish 
imitators. Our contention is that people are less apt to punish 
bad behavior when transgressors imitate those who outrank 
them compared to when they imitate peers or commit a 
transgression no one else committed recently. That is, we 
expect there to be a rank-dependent imitation effect on 
punishment. As we explain below, social learning theory 
(Bandura, 1977, 1986; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998) 
and theories of blame (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014) 
suggest that a rank-dependent imitation effect should emerge 
because bad behavior by high-ranking others affects how 
observers assign blame, which in turn affects punishment. 
Moreover, psychological research on descriptive norms 
suggests that high-ranking individuals’ behavior can alter 
observers’ perceptions of what is typical for group members 
(Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990), which also may mitigate 
punishment. In sum, we expect that bad role models at least 
partially exonerate others' subsequent transgressions of the 
same kind in the eyes of observers.  
Our research contributes to the literature in three main 
ways. First, it contributes to the literature on retributive 
justice by examining whether people become more tolerant 
of bad behavior after it has been modeled by higher-ranking 
members of organizations. Prior research has largely focused 
on relatively stable characteristics of punishers, 
transgressors, and contexts (e.g., Arvey & Jones, 1985; 
Butterfield, Treviño, & Ball, 1996; Podsakoff, 1982). Our 
research is the first to consider more transient features of 
situations (e.g., recent misconduct) as a unique influence on 
culpability and punishment. As in prior research on 
retributive justice (e.g., Darly & Pittman, 2003; Fragale, 
Rosen, Xu, & Merideth, 2009; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2014), 
we focus on lay observers’ reactions to transgressions. 
Although leaders and supervisors have the formal authority 
and responsibility to punish undesirable behavior, employees 
often scold, sabotage, or ostracize their coworkers for 
misbehaving (e.g., Barker, 1993; Gromet & Okimoto, 2014; 
Hollinger & Clark, 1982; O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011; 
Struthers, Miller, Boudens, & Briggs, 2001), and this type of 
punishment from peers is a very effective deterrent of 
unethical behavior (e.g., Hollinger & Clark, 1982; Tittle, 
1977; Tittle & Logan, 1973; Zimring & Hawkins, 1973).  
Second, our research extends recent work in behavioral 
ethics that has begun to address how prior behaviors affect 
subsequent behaviors across levels of the organization. Our 
focus is novel because most other work in this area examines 
people’s propensity to commit unethical behavior, whereas 
we investigate when and how prior transgressions change 
people’s evaluations and responses to others’ unethical 
behavior. Therefore, we offer a new and complementary 
perspective on unethical contagion within organizations 
because we directly examine how prior transgressions—
especially those committed by higher-ranking members of 
organizations—change the environment in which subsequent 
transgressions occur. If, as we suggest, people are less apt to 
punish those who imitate unethical behavior committed by 
higher-ranking members of their organization, then social 
systems may become less responsive to certain transgressions 
over time, which may disinhibit others from acting similarly. 
This dynamic represents one mechanism through which 
unethical behavior may become prevalent in organizations. 
Third, it is well-established that modeling influences 
others’ propensity to act similarly (e.g., Bandura, 1986; Gino, 
Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998), but 
very little is known about whether, when, and why third-party 
observers take bad role models into account when evaluating 
and responding to others’ behavior. That is, we investigate 
whether people take modeling and social learning processes 
into account when evaluating individuals who followed a bad 
role model (i.e., third-party judgments) rather than examine 
how modeling and social learning influences individuals 
contemplating an action (i.e., second-party judgment and 
behavior). Thus, the current research has implications for 
social learning theory as well. 
  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Recent work on ethical leadership and contagion focuses 
on sequences of unethical behaviors in organizations and has 
sought to understand how one individual’s behavioral output 
becomes an input to other individuals’ judgments and 
behaviors (e.g., Brown et al., 2005; Mayer et al., 2009; Smith-
Crowe & Warren, 2014). This work builds on insights from 
social learning theory, which emphasizes that people learn 
how to behave in a given situation by observing others 
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(Bandura, 1977, 1986). Leaders who model bad behavior 
embolden their subordinates to engage in bad behavior 
(Brown et al., 2005; Mawritz et al., 2012; Mayer et al., 2010; 
Mayer et al., 2009). Modeling can also exert an influence up 
or across the organizational hierarchy as well (e.g., Gino et 
al., 2009; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998; Zey-Ferrell & 
Ferrell, 1982). In sum, research that draws from social 
learning theory has begun to articulate processes that explain 
how unethical behavior within organizations unfolds over 
time. 
Although modeling and social learning processes are 
well established as antecedents of behavior, research has not 
considered whether third-party observers take bad role 
models into account when evaluating and responding to 
transgressions. In the sections that follow, we discuss when 
and why we expect people to punish misbehavior differently 
depending on whether a higher-ranking member of the 
organization has recently committed a similar transgression.  
We argue that unethical behavior from higher-ranking 
individuals—but not peers—influences perceived descriptive 
norms for behavior, alters attributions of blame, and reduces 
punishment.  
 
Punishment 
 
Punishment is the administration of an aversive response 
or the removal of a desired response following an undesirable 
behavior (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980; Butterfield et al., 1996; 
Treviño, 1992). Authorities use punishment to change the 
behavior of transgressors, but they also hope to inhibit 
undesirable behavior from others (Arvey & Jones, 1985; 
Treviño, 1992; Nagin, 1998). Because people consider the 
potential for punishment when making ethical decisions 
(Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Treviño & Youngblood, 1990), 
the absence of punishment can promote deviance and 
corruption (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Litzky, Eddleston, & 
Kidder, 2006).  
Behavioral ethics research often assumes that 
punishment is a constant feature of the situation, barring 
changes to the formal rules of the organization (cf. Fragale et 
al., 2009). In practice, however, managers have considerable 
discretion when deciding how to interpret and enforce formal 
rules (Butterfield et al., 1996; Mooijman, van Dijk, Ellmers, 
van Dijk, 2015; Podsakoff, 1982). Moreover, the most 
effective punishment often comes from third-party observers, 
such as peers, rather than leaders (e.g., Hollinger & Clark, 
1982; Tittle, 1977; Tittle & Logan, 1973; Zimring & 
Hawkins, 1973). Employees without formal authority can 
punish their coworkers (or even their supervisors) by 
scolding, sabotaging, or ostracizing transgressors (e.g., 
Barker, 1993; Hollinger & Clark, 1982; O’Reilly & Aquino, 
2011; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Struthers, Miller, 
Boudens, & Briggs, 2001), and standards for these informal 
forms of punishment rarely exist. In sum, punishment is a 
common part of social and organizational life for many 
people, irrespective of their formal responsibilities (Treviño, 
1992), and two people who commit the same transgression 
may receive different amounts of punishment.  
Research traditionally focuses on stable characteristics 
of people and situations as key antecedents of punishment, 
perhaps because the goal of much of this work is to 
understand how punishment relates to sustained work 
behaviors (e.g., effort and performance; Arvey & Jones, 
1985; Podsakoff, 1982). Much less research considers more 
transient influences that are common in situations when 
transgressions occur, such as whether others in the 
organization committed similar transgressions. We expect 
that transgressors are punished less when they imitate 
someone who outranks them compared to when they imitate 
peers or commit a transgression that no one else committed 
recently. In the following sections, we discuss two 
complementary mechanisms that may contribute to this rank-
dependent imitation effect: attributions of blame and 
descriptive norms.  
 
Attributions of Blame 
  
Although people use punishment to reduce undesirable 
behavior, not all undesirable behavior warrants punishment. 
To determine the appropriate level of punishment for an 
offense, people evaluate the extent to which the actor 
deserves blame (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Malle, Guglielmo, 
& Monroe, 2014; O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011; Shaver, 1985; 
Weiner, 1995). Blame is a negative evaluation of an actor 
based on a judgment that the actor intentionally engaged in 
unwarranted, norm-incongruent, negative behavior (Malle et 
al., 2014). To assign blame, people perform a complex set of 
appraisals that consider whether the actor intentionally 
caused the event (e.g., Cushman, 2008; Fragale et al., 2009; 
Malle & Knobe, 1997; Shaver, 1985; Sloman, Fernbach, & 
Ewing, 2009) and whether there are mitigating circumstances 
or reasons that may justify the action (e.g., Malle, 2004; 
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Riordan, Marlin, & Kellogg, 1983; Scanlon, 2008).1 In sum, 
blame is a judgment about an actor rather than an evaluation 
of a behavior or an outcome, and observers may disapprove 
of an action, independent of whether they also condemn the 
actor. 
Imitation may directly influence how much people 
blame transgressors. People generally assume that 
subordinates have less causal agency in their organization’s 
activities and therefore are more willing to attribute the 
successes and failures of organizations to higher- than lower-
ranking members (Hamilton, 1978; Hamilton & Sanders, 
1981; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985; Zemba, Young, & 
Morris, 2006). Also, people expect higher-ranking 
individuals to bear more responsibility (Bell & Tetlock, 
1989; Sanders et al., 1996; Treviño, 1992; Weiner, 1995; see 
also Bandura, 1999; Milgram 1974) and lower-ranking 
individuals to conform to examples set by higher-ranking 
authorities (Overbeck, Tiedens, & Brion, 2006). Compared 
to higher-ranking individuals, people perceive lower-ranking 
individuals’ behavior as less intentional (Fragale et al., 2009), 
more confined by organizational scripts (Gioia, 1992; Gioia 
& Poole, 1984), and governed more by situational than 
dispositional influences (Overbeck et al., 2006). In sum, 
people tend to attribute less intentionality and responsibility 
to low- than high-ranking individuals, which in turn should 
reduce blame and punishment for low-ranking transgressors.  
Although prior work finds that people’s attributions for 
a behavior differ depending on the actor’s rank, we are aware 
of no research that considers imitation in conjunction with 
rank. We expect that the behaviors of high-ranking role 
models activate lay theories of intentionality and 
responsibility for lower-ranking members of a hierarchy, 
which in turn attenuate how much blame people attribute to 
imitators. In other words, imitation makes salient social 
influences on behavior, especially when the first actor 
outranks the imitator. As a result, people are less inclined to 
punish transgressors who imitate those who outrank them 
compared to when they imitate peers or commit a 
transgression no one else committed recently. 
 
Descriptive Norms and Norm Focus 
 
The rank-dependent imitation effect may also depend in 
part on observers’ understanding of what is typical behavior 
                                                        
1 Malle et al. (2014) argue that their conceptualization of blame subsumes 
and extends prior work on responsibility (e.g., Jones, 1991; Treviño, 1992; 
Weiner, 1995). They avoid the term “responsibility” because they believe 
its usage in the literature is varied and at times imprecise. 
in a given situation. People compare behavior with norms to 
identify whether or to what degree a violation has occurred 
(Malle et al., 2014; Treviño, 1992). The focus theory of 
normative conduct indicates that two different types of norms 
can be salient in a given situation (Cialdini et al., 1990; 
Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Injunctive norms reflect beliefs 
about how people ought to behave. Descriptive norms, in 
contrast, reflect beliefs about how most people in a group 
actually behave. Given that injunctions are the core of 
deontological theories of normative ethics (Kagan, 1998; 
Kamm, 2007), one might expect injunctive norms to 
dominate people’s evaluations of ethical behavior. However, 
descriptive norms can have a powerful influence on the 
perceived permissibility of unethical behavior when they are 
salient (Cialdini et al., 1990; Gino et al., 2009; Mayer et al., 
2013; see also Moore & Gino, 2013). For example, padding 
an expense report may seem more permissible when 
evaluated against descriptive norms (e.g., “many people in 
the company pad their expense reports”) rather than against 
injunctive norms (e.g., “company rules mandate accurate 
statements of expenses”).  
In the case of imitation, the relative rank of the two actors 
(i.e., the initial transgressor and the imitator) may be 
especially important to the salience and the content of 
descriptive norms for two reasons.2 First, people pay more 
attention to those in high- than low-ranking positions (Fiske, 
Morling, & Stevens, 1996; Flynn & Amanatullah, 2012; 
Giordano, 1983; Goode, 1978; Mawritz et al., 2012; 
Ridgeway & Correll, 2006), which makes high-ranking 
individuals’ behavior a salient signal of descriptive norms. 
Second, high rank is an explicit indication of the 
organization’s approval and acceptance of an individual, 
which contributes to the individual’s perceived credibility as 
a role model (Bandura, 1977, 1986; Brown et al., 2005; 
Mayer et al., 2009). Together, these two features of rank 
indicate that the behavior of high- rather than low-ranking 
members of an organization are more likely to influence 
perceived descriptive norms, which in turn can serve as the 
point of comparison people use to assess subsequent 
transgressions. 
Descriptive norms may contribute to the rank-dependent 
imitation effect by acting either in parallel (i.e., independent, 
single-stage mediation) or sequentially (i.e., two-stage 
mediation) with attributions of blame. Specifically, 
2 Although sociological research views norms as collective-level constructs 
that are stable over time, psychological research suggests that individuals’ 
sense of what is normative may diverge from others’ views and from an 
objectively measurable collective-level assessment (see Tost, 2011 for a 
detailed discussion of this issue). 
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descriptive norms may independently mediate the rank-
dependent imitation effect because people generally believe 
that punishment should be proportional to the degree of the 
violation (Treviño, 1992). Therefore, if the initial 
transgressor’s behavior changes perceived descriptive norms, 
it would reduce the discrepancy between norms and the 
imitator’s behavior, and people should, in turn, recommend 
less punishment for the imitator.  
Alternatively or additionally (these two paths need not 
be mutually exclusive), descriptive norms may operate 
sequentially with attributions of blame and affect the rank-
dependent imitation effect. Behavior that diverges from 
relevant norms is perceived negatively, and this perception 
initiates a search to understand its cause, including the extent 
to which someone is to blame (Malle & Knobe, 1997; Wong 
& Weiner, 1981). Moreover, the magnitude of the divergence 
between the behavior and the norm affects how people assign 
blame; people are more inclined to blame someone when the 
divergence is greater (e.g., Alicke, 2000; Alicke & Davis, 
1989; Baron & Hershey, 1988). Therefore, if the initial 
transgressor’s behavior changes perceived descriptive norms 
and reduces the discrepancy between norms and the 
imitator’s behavior, then people should be less motivated to 
assign blame for the transgression, which in turn should lead 
to lower levels of blame and, ultimately, less punishment.  
In summary, we suggest that imitating higher-ranking 
members of an organization influences punishment because 
it affects attributions of blame and descriptive norms, and 
these mediating processes may operate in parallel, in a 
sequence, or both. That is, attributions of blame may depend, 
at least in part, on the extent to which an initial transgressor’s 
behavior influences perceived descriptive norms. In other 
words, holding features of the transgression itself constant, 
low-ranking imitators are likely to receive less punishment 
when they imitate higher-ranking members of their 
organization compared to when they imitate peers or commit 
a transgression no one else committed recently. Moreover, 
this rank-dependent imitation effect on punishment should be 
mediated by attributions of blame, perceived descriptive 
norms, or both. Stated formally: 
 
Hypothesis 1a. For an identical transgression, observers 
recommend less severe punishment for people who imitate 
those who outrank them in their organization compared to 
people who commit a transgression no one else committed 
recently.  
 
Hypothesis 1b. For an identical transgression, observers 
recommend less severe punishment for people who imitate 
those who outrank them than for people of the same rank who 
imitate their peers. 
 
Hypothesis 2a. The relationship between imitation and 
punishment is mediated by attributions of blame. 
 
Hypothesis 2b. The relationship between imitation and 
punishment is mediated by perceived descriptive norms. 
 
Hypothesis 2c. The relationship between imitation and 
punishment is sequentially mediated by both perceived 
descriptive norms and attributions of blame. 
 
STUDY 1 
 
Study 1 examined punishment as a function of whether a 
transgressor imitated another person who had previously 
committed the same transgression and whether the other 
person was higher-ranked or the same rank as the focal 
transgressor. Participants read that researchers were 
crowdsourcing the review of a large number of video 
recordings from another study. The rank of the two people in 
the video and whether the people in the video broke the rules 
and stole money varied across experimental conditions. After 
reviewing the video, participants had an opportunity to 
punish the focal transgressor if they felt his behavior 
warranted it.  
 
Participants 
 
Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers (N = 200) earned 
$2.00 to complete the study. All were residents of the United 
States. We excluded data from 21 respondents who failed one 
or both of the following attention checks: (1) Three 
participants failed to solve a puzzle matrix from the task the 
people in the video completed; they searched for two of 12 
numbers in a grid that summed to 10. Therefore, success 
depended more on motivation (i.e., willingness to search) 
than ability (i.e., basic arithmetic); (2) Fourteen participants 
failed to successfully complete an item embedded in the 
measures that stated, “To indicate you are reading carefully, 
please mark slightly agree.” Four participants failed both. 
The resultant sample (N = 179) was 38% female and ranged 
in age from 18 to 69 (M = 35.38, SD = 10.71); 74.9% 
identified as White, 10.6% as African American or Black, 
8.4% as Asian, 6.7% as Hispanic or Latino/Latina, and 2.8% 
as Native American, Native Hawaiian, or Pacific Islander. 
Nearly all had more than one year of full-time work 
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experience (91.0%), including 47.8% who had more than 11 
years of experience.  
 
Design and Procedure 
 
Participants read that researchers were crowdsourcing the 
review of a large number of video recordings from another 
study. Ostensibly, the researchers conducted the study in 
many rooms simultaneously and were unable supervise all of 
them. Therefore, the sessions were video-recorded, and the 
researchers were now seeking to identify any irregular 
behavior. Participants read that the people in the video were 
students who had worked closely together on a team during 
orientation week before the fall academic term began. In 
reality, the people in the videos were two paid actors who 
appeared in all of the videos and sat in the same position 
across experimental conditions. In the videos, the actors were 
asked to solve a series of math matrices (see Mazar, Amir, & 
Ariely, 2008). Participants solved a sample matrix before 
watching the video to familiarize them with the task and how 
much time and effort it required (see supplemental 
information for details).  
The video shot from a single perspective from a camera 
mounted on the wall of the room. The instructions told 
participants to evaluate the person on the right side of the 
screen and explained that another participant would watch the 
video and evaluate the person on the left. At the beginning of 
each video, an experimenter who remained out of view 
ushered two people into a room and asked them to seat 
themselves at a table in the middle of the frame. The 
experimenter described the matrix task and explained that 
pay was based on performance; participants were to pay 
themselves $0.50 for each matrix they solved correctly during 
a four minute work period. Each person was given an 
envelope that contained nine $1 bills and four quarters (i.e., 
$10, or enough to pay someone who solved all 20 matrices 
correctly). After watching the video, participants completed 
a survey that included the dependent measure, manipulation 
checks, and demographic items. All measures included in the 
study are reported below. 
Rank Manipulation. To manipulate rank, the 
description of the person on the left of the screen and the way 
the actor was dressed varied across conditions. In the higher 
rank condition, the person on the left wore a suit, and the 
description indicated that he was a senior student in the final 
year of the program who was selected as a team leader 
because he was highly regarded and admired by his 
classmates. The person on the right was described as a team 
member who was beginning the first year of the program. In 
the same rank condition, both people in the video wore a t-
shirt and jeans, and both were described as team members 
who were beginning the program; there was no mention of a 
team leader.  
Imitation Manipulation. The actor on the right always 
took all of the money without solving any matrices, but the 
behavior of the actor on the left varied across conditions. In 
the imitation condition, the actor on the left put down his pen 
a short time after the experimenter left the room, inverted the 
envelope of money to empty its contents, and left the room. 
The actor on the right watched the person on the left and then 
did the same a short time later. In the no imitation condition, 
the actor on the left work on solving matrices for the duration 
of the video. A short time after the experimenter left the 
room, the actor on the right removed all $10 from the 
envelope and left the room without solving a single matrix.  
Punishment. The instructions explained that 
“…participants sometimes do things that are undesirable 
when a supervisor is not in the room. When that happens, we 
enforce the rules by preventing participants from signing up 
for future studies for a period of time. For example, 
participants are not allowed to eat, drink, or talk on the phone 
while they are supposed to be working on a task. If 
participants violate these rules, we usually ban them from 
future studies for one month. Of course, more serious 
violations would necessitate longer bans.” Participants could 
punish the actor on the right by indicating how many months, 
if any, he should be banned from future studies. Responses 
were permitted to range from 0 to 12 months (M = 8.52, SD 
= 4.67). 
 
Results 
 
Manipulation Check. Three items indicated that the 
rank manipulation was successful. Specifically, participants 
compared two people in the video in terms of rank, status, 
and seniority using 7-point bipolar scales with higher scores 
indicating higher rank for the person on the left (α = .93). A 
2 (Other Actor Rank: higher rank, same rank) × 2 (Imitation: 
imitation, no imitation) ANOVA found a main effect of other 
actor rank. The other actor was higher ranking in the higher 
rank (M = 5.90, SD = 1.11) than same rank conditions (M = 
4.42, SD = 0.71), F(1, 178) = 113.56, p < .001, η2p = .40. The 
main effect of the imitation, F(1, 178) = 1.87, p = .17, η2p = 
.01, and the interaction were not significant, F(1, 178) = 0.08, 
p = .78, η2p = .00. 
Punishment. A 2 (Other Actor Rank: higher rank, same 
rank) × 2 (Imitation: imitation, no imitation) ANOVA 
indicated that the main effect of rank on punishment was 
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marginally significant, F(1, 175) = 3.53, p = .06, η2p = .02. 
Participants punished the focal actor slightly less severely 
when the other actor was higher ranking (M = 7.86, SD = 
4.95) rather than the same rank (M = 9.13, SD = 4.33). The 
main effect of imitation was significant, F(1, 175) = 12.85, p 
< .001, η2p = .07. Participants punished the focal actor less 
severely when he imitated the behavior of the other (M = 
7.30, SD = 4.97) compared to when he was the only one to 
steal money (M = 9.68, SD = 4.07). However, the interaction 
of rank and imitation was significant, F(1, 175) = 4.60, p = 
.03, η2p = .03 (see Figure 1).  
Planned comparisons tested Hypotheses 1a and 1b. In 
support of Hypothesis 1a, participants punished the focal 
actor less severely when he imitated a higher-ranking actor 
compared to when he was the only one to steal money, F(1, 
175) = 16.15, p < .001, η2p = .08, but punishment for the focal 
actor was the same when he imitated a peer or was the only 
one to steal money, F(1, 175) = 1.05, p = .31, η2p = .01. In 
support of Hypothesis 1b, punishment for the focal actor was 
less severe when he imitated someone higher-ranking rather 
than a peer, F(1, 175) = 7.97, p = .005, η2p = .04. 
 
Figure 1: The effects of first actor rank and imitation on punishment in 
Study 1 
 
Discussion 
 
Study 1 indicated punishment depended on imitation and 
the relative rank of those involved. For the same 
transgression, punishment was less severe for the focal actor 
when he imitated a transgression committed by someone 
higher-ranking than when he imitated a peer or did not imitate 
anyone. In other words, it appears that people take imitation 
into account when levying punishment, depending on the 
relative rank of those involved. 
STUDY 2 
 
One limitation of Study 1 is that we manipulated rank by 
varying the non-focal actor’s role and title (team leader or 
team member), attire (formal or casual), and year in the 
program (senior student in the final year of the program or 
new student beginning the first year of the program). 
Therefore, rank is one likely explanation for the effects we 
observed, but other factors correlated with rank, such as 
perceived age or tenure in organization, may have contributed 
to the effects. Study 2 sought to replicate the results of Study 
1 in a new context and rule out alternative explanations for 
the observed effects by manipulating rank solely by varying 
job title.  
Study 2 also began to explore the boundary conditions 
and mechanisms responsible for the rank-dependent imitation 
effect. Researchers often investigate mechanisms by 
measuring the proposed intervening variables and testing 
statistical mediation, but experiments that manipulate the 
proposed mechanism also can provide evidence of 
mechanisms (Sigall & Mills, 1998; Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 
2005). We argue that the rank-dependent imitation effect on 
punishment arises because the first actor’s behavior is either 
seen as a mitigating circumstance that reduces blame for the 
imitator or makes the behavior seem more normal (or both). 
These mechanisms should only engage when transgressors 
are members of the same organization. The first actor’s 
behavior should only operate as a plausible reason or excuse 
that mitigates blame for the second actor when the two actors 
are linked by organizational membership; reasons and 
justifications for a particular behavior can mitigate blame 
(Malle, 2004; Riordan et al., 1983; Scanlon, 2008), but in the 
case of a transgression in the workplace, it is likely that 
observers would believe that following a supervisor’s lead is 
a better justification than following the lead of someone 
unaffiliated with the organization. Likewise, the first actor’s 
behavior only should affect the descriptive norms that apply 
to the second actor when the two actors are members of the 
same organization. In short, group membership of the two 
actors should moderate the rank-dependent imitation effect.  
Study 2 manipulated first actor rank and whether the two 
actors belonged to the same organization to create a 2 (First 
Actor Rank: higher rank, same rank) x 2 (Organizational 
Membership: same, different) between-subjects design. We 
expected observers to punish the imitator less severely when 
he imitated a higher- rather than same-ranked person from the 
same company, but punishment would be high, irrespective 
of rank, when the instigator was from a different company. In 
other words, we expected that the rank-dependent imitation 
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effect would be attenuated when the two actors belonged to 
different organizations.  
 
Participants 
 
Two hundred Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers earned 
$1.00 to complete the study. All were residents of the United 
States. We excluded data from 44 respondents who failed one 
or more of three attention checks: (1) “To indicate you are 
reading carefully, please mark slightly agree.” (2) “Were the 
two people from the same or a different company?” Response 
options were “Same Company,” or “Different Company,” (3) 
Participants who spent less than six seconds on the page that 
presented the scenario (i.e., we excluded people who spent 
less than 1/10th of the average time; Mean = 60.5 seconds; 
Median = 54.0 seconds). The resultant sample (N = 156) was 
36% female, and ranged in age from 18 to 64 (M = 32.72, SD 
= 11.00).  
 
Design and Procedure 
 
The experiment was a 2 (First Actor Rank: higher rank, 
same rank) × 2 (Organizational Membership: same, different) 
between-subjects design. Participants read about an event 
that ostensibly occurred in a midsized, financial services 
company located in the United States. A vignette explained 
that the company issued credit cards to employees for 
business-related expenses. Employees are required to 
complete and sign an expense report that affirms that charges 
to the card are for legitimate business purposes. The vignette 
then described a recent incident when a junior analyst 
witnessed another person charge over $3,100 to a company 
credit card for a lavish dinner, expensive wine, and special 
tickets to a sold out show. The vignette explicitly stated that 
these expenses were for personal entertainment for the 
employee and his friends and did not relate to clients or 
business in any way. The junior analyst then heard from 
another employee at the company that the person claimed on 
his expense report that the $3,100 in charges were for 
entertaining clients. The junior analyst then imitated the 
behavior by charging over $3100 to the card for personal 
meals and entertainment and claiming that the charges were 
for entertaining clients. All measures included in the study 
are reported below. 
First Actor Rank Manipulation. The rank of the first 
actor in the vignette varied across conditions. Participants in 
the higher rank condition read that the first actor was a Vice 
President. Participants in the same rank condition read that 
the first actor was another junior analyst.  
Organizational Membership Manipulation. The actors’ 
employers also varied across experimental conditions. 
Participants in the same company condition read that the first 
and second actors worked for the same company. Participants 
in the different company condition read that the first and 
second actors worked for different companies.  
Punishment Severity. Three items assessed punishment 
severity: (1) How severely should [target] be punished (1 = 
not severe at all, 7 = very severe); (2) How strong should the 
punishment for [target] be (1 = not strong at all, 7 = very 
strong); (3) How harsh should the punishment for [target] be 
(1 = not harsh at all, 7 = very harsh). The first item was a 
single-item measure of punishment in previous research 
(Wiltermuth & Flynn, 2013), and we developed the second 
and third items based on the first one. The items were 
averaged for analysis (α = .98).  
 
Results 
 
Manipulation Check. Four items at the end of the study 
indicated that the rank manipulation was successful. 
Participants rated “How prestigious…” and “How high in 
status is the job of junior analyst” (α = .92) and “How 
prestigious…” and “How high in status is the job of Vice 
President” (α = .83) using 7-point scales that ranged from 1 
= not at all to 7 = extremely. A repeated measures ANOVA 
found that Vice President (M = 6.39, SD = 0.71) was 
perceived as higher rank than junior analyst (M = 3.67, SD = 
1.16), F(1, 155) = 935.90, p < .001, η2p = .86. 
Punishment. A 2 (First Actor Rank: higher rank, same 
rank) × 2 (Organization Membership: same, different) 
ANOVA with punishment severity as the dependent variable 
indicated that the main effect for first actor rank was not 
significant, F(1, 152) = 0.21, p = .65, η2p = .00. The main 
effect for organization membership was significant, F(1, 152) 
= 6.05, p = .02, η2p = .04. Punishment was less severe when 
the second actor imitated someone from the same (M = 5.33, 
SD = 1.58) rather than a different company (M = 5.89, SD = 
1.13). However, the interaction of first actor rank and 
organizational membership was significant, F(1, 152) = 5.30, 
p = .02, η2p = .03. Analyses of simple effects investigated the 
effect of first actor rank at each level of organization 
membership (see Figure 2). When the two actors were from 
the same company, punishment was less severe when the first 
actor was higher-ranked rather than a peer, F(1, 152) = 4.24, 
p = .04, η2p = .03. When the two actors were from different 
companies, punishment severity was the same, regardless of 
first actor rank, F(1, 152) = 1.54, p = .22, η2p = .01. In short, 
the results of Study 2 support Hypothesis 1b and also provide 
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initial support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b; imitation reduced 
punishment, but only when the actors were from the same 
company.  
 
Figure 2. The effects of organizational membership and first actor rank on 
punishment in Study 2 
 
Discussion 
 
Study 2 provided additional evidence for the rank-
dependent imitation effect using a different method and a 
different measure of punishment. Specifically, people 
punished imitators less severely when they imitated a higher-
ranking member of their organization compared to when they 
imitated a peer. However, punishment did not differ as a 
function of the rank of those involved when the two people 
were members of different organizations. Given that out-
group members should not influence attributions of blame or 
perceptions of descriptive norms, the results provide initial 
evidence that attributions of blame and descriptive norms 
may play a role in the rank-dependent imitation effect.  
 
STUDY 3 
 
Study 3 investigated the mechanisms that underpin the 
rank-dependent imitation effect by measuring blame and 
descriptive norms including statistical tests of mediation. 
Study 3 also tested if the effect we have labeled “imitation” 
necessarily involves imitation or whether any prior 
transgression committed by a higher-ranking member of the 
organization might attenuate punishment. Imitation, by 
definition, is the replication of one person’s behavior by 
another, and replication connotes a high degree of similarity 
between the behaviors. However, any prior transgression, 
regardless of similarity, may influence people’s reactions to 
subsequent transgressions from the perspective of research 
on ethical climate, which refers to individuals’ holistic 
impressions of the (un)ethical conduct within a unit or 
organization (Victor & Cullen, 1988). Therefore, it is 
important to test whether imitation is a distinct from ethical 
climate. 
Studies 1 and 2 explored the rank-dependent imitation 
effect as a function of the relation between the actors. Study 
3, in contrast, examined the rank-dependent imitation effect 
as a function of the relation between the two actors’ 
behaviors. Specifically, Study 3 manipulated the degree of 
similarity between the bad behaviors committed by two 
people in an organization and tested whether behavioral 
similarity affected punishment. Because Study 3 examined 
two behaviors and used a fully crossed design, Study 3 also 
tested the rank-dependent imitation effect in a new context 
and sought additional evidence of the robustness of the effect 
across behaviors. 
 
Participants 
 
Two hundred Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers earned 
$2.00 to complete the study. All were residents of the United 
States. We excluded data from 45 respondents who failed one 
or more of three attention checks: (1) “To indicate you are 
reading carefully, please mark slightly agree.” (2) 
“According to what you read, what did the [focal target] do?” 
Response options were “Used the company credit card to pay 
for personal entertainment,” “Took home company 
electronics equipment to for home entertainment,” or 
“Created false client referrals for personal gain,” (3) 
Participants who spent less than six seconds on the page that 
presented the scenario (i.e., we excluded people who spent 
less than 1/10th of the average time; Mean = 63.1 seconds; 
Median = 55.7 seconds). The resultant sample (N = 155) was 
41% female, ranged in age from 18 to 67 (M = 32.78, SD = 
9.72), and averaged 12.09 years (SD = 9.06) of work 
experience.  
 
Design and Procedure 
 
The experiment was a 2 (First Actor Transgression: 
expense report, electronics equipment) × 2 (Second Actor 
Transgression: expense report, electronics equipment) 
between-subjects design. The scenario was similar to the one 
used in Study 2, but participants read about two 
transgressions. The first transgression always was committed 
by a Vice President, and the second transgression always was 
committed by a junior analyst in the same company. 
However, the type of transgression each actor committed 
varied across conditions. Therefore, the design included 
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instances when the transgressions matched (i.e., both actors 
filed false expense reports; both actors stole electronics 
equipment) and instances when the transgressions did not 
match (i.e., the Vice President filed a false expense report and 
the junior analyst stole equipment; the Vice President stole 
equipment and the junior analyst filed a false expense report). 
 
Transgression Manipulations  
 
The expense report conditions of Study 3 were identical 
to the transgressions used in Study 2. In short, the 
transgressor charged over $3,100 to the company credit card 
for a lavish night out with friends and claimed he was 
entertaining clients. In the electronics equipment conditions, 
the transgressor came to the office on a Saturday and took 
home equipment worth over $3,100. When the first actor 
stole equipment, participants read that the junior analyst saw 
the Vice President load several unopened boxes of electronics 
equipment into his car and later learned from another 
employee that some new electronics inventory was missing. 
When the second actor stole equipment, participants read that 
the junior analyst took home a large TV, computer, and other 
equipment and used it to create a home entertainment system. 
All conditions explicitly indicated that the equipment had 
been misappropriated by the transgressor. 
 
Measures 
 
All measures included in the study are reported below. 
Punishment Severity. Study 3 used the same three items 
as Study 2 (α = .97).  
Punishment Recommendation. Participants selected the 
single most appropriate punishment from a list of options 
presented in order of increasing severity: (1) Ignore the act, 
(2) Talk to the person informally, (3) Issue an oral warning, 
(4) Issue a written warning, (5) Withhold a portion of bonus 
pay, (6) Put on probation (next infraction terminate), (7) 
Suspend without pay, (8) Demote to lower position, (9) 
Terminate. This measure was first developed by Trahan and 
Steiner (1994) and further refined by Greenberg and 
Ganegoda (2009).3 
Descriptive Norms. Four items assessed participants’ 
perceptions of the descriptive norms that pertained to the 
second actor’s behavior: (1) In this company, it is pretty 
common for people to do what [the second actor] did; (2) I 
                                                        
3 We independently validated this scale by asking a separate sample of 100 
Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers to rank these punishment options in 
terms of severity. Respondents’ severity rankings were consistent with the 
think a lot of people who work for this company have done 
what [the second actor] did; (3) [The second actor] did 
something that a lot of people in their organization would do; 
(4) [The second actor] acted outside the range of normal 
behavior for this organization [reverse-scored]. Participants 
responded on 7-point scales that ranged from 1 = strongly 
disagree to 7 = strongly agree. Responses were averaged for 
analysis (α = .91).  
Attributions of Blame. Five items assessed blame for the 
second actor’s behavior by asking participants how much 
they agreed with the following statements: (1) It is 
completely [the second actor]'s fault that he did something 
wrong; (2) [The second actor] is solely to blame for his 
behavior; (3) [The second actor] is fully responsible for his 
actions; (4) [The first actor] deserves some of the blame for 
[the second actor]'s behavior (reverse coded); (5) [The first 
actor] is partially responsible for [the second actor]'s behavior 
(reverse coded). Participants responded on 7-point scales that 
ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. 
Exploratory factor analysis with an oblique rotation assessed 
the extent to which the items that asked about blame for the 
second actor’s transgression were related; that is, it tested 
whether people tended to blame the second actor less when 
they blamed the first actor (and vice versa). The analysis 
yielded a one factor solution, which indicates that the items 
for first actor blame and second actor blame were strongly 
related. Therefore, we report analyses that use a single index 
of blame based on the average of the five items after reverse 
scoring items 4 – 5 (α = .89). However, we also ran 
mediational analyses using separate blame indices for the 
second (items 1 - 3) and first actor (items 4 - 5) and found 
that the pattern of results is the same, regardless of whether 
analyses use one or two indices of blame for the second 
actor’s behavior.  
 
Results 
 
Punishment Severity. A 2 (First Actor Transgression: 
expense report, electronics equipment) × 2 (Second Actor 
Transgression: expense report, electronics equipment) 
ANOVA with punishment severity as the dependent variable 
found no significant main effect for either first actor 
transgression, F(1, 148) = 0.31, p = .58, η2p = .00, or second 
actor transgression, F(1, 148) = 2.39, p = .13, η2p = .02. 
However, the interaction of first and second actor 
order used in prior research, irrespective of whether we presented the items 
in the order listed above or in an order that was randomly generated for 
each respondent (i.e., many different orders). 
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transgression was significant, F(1, 148) = 13.18, p < .001, η2p 
= .08. Analyses of simple effects investigated punishment 
severity as a function of whether the two actors committed 
the same or different transgressions (see Figure 3a). When the 
second actor falsified an expense report, punishment was less 
severe when the first actor also falsified an expense report (M 
= 5.58, SD = 1.20) than when the first actor stole electronics 
(M = 6.15, SD = 1.00), F(1, 148) = 4.73, p = .03, η2p = .03. 
When the second actor stole electronics, punishment was less 
severe when first actor stole electronics (M = 5.19, SD = 1.48) 
than when the first actor falsified an expense report (M = 
5.97, SD = 0.81), F(1, 148) = 8.76, p = .004, η2p = .06.  
 
Figure 3a. The effect of transgression similarity on punishment severity in 
Study 3 
 
 
Punishment Recommendation. A 2 (First Actor 
Transgression: expense report, electronics equipment) × 2 
(Second Actor Transgression: expense report, electronics 
equipment) ANOVA with punishment recommendation as 
the dependent variable found no significant main effect for 
either first actor transgression, F(1, 148) = 0.07, p = .94, η2p 
= .00, or second actor transgression, F(1, 148) = 0.25, p = .62, 
η2p = .00.4 However, the interaction of first and second actor 
transgression was significant, F(1, 148) = 11.67, p = .001, η2p 
= .07. Analyses of simple effects investigated punishment 
recommendation as a function of whether the two actors 
committed the same or different transgressions (see Figure 
3b). When the second actor falsified an expense report, 
punishment was less harsh when the first actor also falsified 
an expense report (M = 6.53, SD = 2.04) than when the first 
actor stole electronics (M = 7.68, SD = 1.96), F(1, 148) = 
5.57, p = .02, η2p = .04. When the second actor stole 
electronics, punishment was less harsh when first actor stole 
electronics (M = 6.32, SD = 2.50) than when the first actor 
                                                        
4 Punishment recommendation is an ordinal variable and therefore violates 
some assumptions of ANOVA. Therefore, we conducted ordinal regression 
analyses to verify the robustness of the ANOVA results. All significance 
falsified an expense report (M = 7.54, SD = 2.04), F(1, 148) 
= 6.11, p = .02, η2p = .04. 
 
Figure 3b. The effect of transgression similarity on punishment 
recommendations in Study 3
 
 
Tests of Mediation 
 
We hypothesized that descriptive norms and attributions 
of blame would mediate the rank-dependent imitation effect 
on punishment. In Study 3, we operationalized imitation in 
terms of whether the actors committed the same or different 
transgressions. In the analyses above, we kept the 
independent variables separate to illustrate that the rank-
dependent imitation effect generalized across transgression 
type; that is, transgression similarity (i.e., imitation) reduced 
punishment, regardless of whether both actors submitted 
fraudulent expense reports or stole electronics equipment. To 
simplify presentation of the mediation analyses below, we 
collapsed across the independent variables to form an index 
of transgression similarity/dissimilarity. However, we did 
verify that analyses of mediated moderation that model the 
indirect effects without collapsing across the two 
independent variables produced the same patterns of results. 
Preliminary analyses indicated that attributions of blame 
and descriptive norms both differed as a function of 
transgression similarity, that is, whether the first and second 
actor committed the same or a different transgression (see 
supplemental information for details). Therefore, to fully 
explore the potential relations between the mediator 
variables, we ran a multi-stage mediation model that 
estimated the indirect effect of transgression similarity on 
punishment through descriptive norms, the indirect effect 
through attributions of blame, and the two-stage indirect 
tests using ordinal regression matched the results of the ANOVAs. In 
particular, the interaction of the two manipulations on the punishment 
recommendations variable was significant, Wald χ2(1) = 14.15, p < .001. 
Figures 4a-b. Statistical models of the rank-dependent imitation effect on punishment through perceived commonness and attributions of blame in Study 3. 
 
Figure 4a: Punishment Severity 
 
Figure 4b: Punishment Recommendation 
 
Note. ** p < .01; † p < .10. 
 
effect through both descriptive norms and blame (Hayes, 
2013). This approach allowed us to include both mediators 
simultaneously and also test the association between 
descriptive norms and blame.  
We tested the models using a bootstrapping procedure 
that generated 1000 bootstrap samples to estimate the size of 
the indirect effects. When punishment severity was the 
criterion (see Figure 4a), the single-stage indirect effect 
through blame was significant, βc’ = -.24 (confidence interval: 
-.48, -.09), SE = .09. The single-stage indirect effect through 
descriptive norms was not significant, βc’ = -.04 (confidence 
interval: -.15, .04), SE = .05. However, the two-stage indirect 
effect through both descriptive norms and attributions of 
blame was significant, βc’ = -.09 (confidence interval: -.23, -
.03), SE = .05. Results were very similar when punishment 
recommendation was the criterion (Figure 4b). Again, the 
single-stage indirect effect through blame was significant, βc’ 
= -.36 (confidence interval: -.69, -.12), SE = .14. The single-
stage indirect effect through descriptive norms was not 
significant, βc’ = -.09 (confidence interval: -.30, .07), SE = 
.09. However, the two-stage indirect effect through both 
descriptive norms and attributions of blame was significant, 
βc’ = -.14 (confidence interval: -.35, -.04), SE = .07. Taken 
together, the mediation models for both operationalizations 
of punishment support Hypotheses 2a and 2c, but do not 
support Hypothesis 2b. 
 
Discussion 
 
Study 3 found evidence that the rank-dependent 
imitation effect is action-specific; observers are less inclined 
to punish transgressors when their behavior exactly matches 
a high-ranking individual’s bad behavior compared to when 
their behavior is of the same economic magnitude but 
otherwise different from a high-ranking individual’s bad 
behavior. One important implication of this finding is that 
imitation has a unique influence on punishment, above and 
beyond the extent to which dissimilar prior transgressions 
promote leniency for subsequent transgressions. Given that 
all conditions of Study 3 included two transgressions, 
differences in punishment between conditions in which the 
transgressions were the same or different cannot be explained 
by the broader concept of ethical climate.  
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Study 3 also provided direct evidence of the processes 
responsible for the rank-dependent imitation effect. 
Mediation analyses indicated that attributions of blame play 
a central role in the imitation effect; imitation influences 
punishment because it affects whom observers blame for the 
second transgression. The more people blame the first actor, 
the less they tend to blame the imitator (and vice versa), 
which in turn influences punishment. Imitation also 
influenced descriptive norms, which in turn influenced blame 
and punishment, but all significant indirect effects went 
through blame.  
 
STUDY 4 
 
Study 4 addressed some potential limitations of Studies 
1 – 3 and further tested the mechanisms behind the rank-
dependent imitation effect. In particular, Study 4 manipulated 
the rank of both the first and second actor to create an 
exploratory condition where a high-ranking actor imitated 
another high-ranking actor. This condition provided an 
experimental test of role of descriptive norms in the imitation 
effect. If high-ranking actors’ behaviors influence descriptive 
norms and descriptive norms play a role in the imitation 
effect, then people should punish both low and high ranking 
imitators less when they imitate high versus low ranking 
actors (because the high-ranking first actor’s behavior should 
influence descriptive norms regardless of the rank of the 
second actor).5 In short, Study 4 was similar to Study 1, but 
it manipulated the ranks of both actors. Study 4 also differed 
from Study 1 because participants were university students 
who evaluated fellow students at their university. 
Furthermore, Study 4 used new videos with different actors 
and a new rank manipulation to address generalizability. 
 
Participants 
 
Two hundred undergraduate students at a large, public 
university earned $5.00 to complete the study. We excluded 
data from seven respondents who failed one or both of the 
attention checks used in Study 1; three participants failed to 
successfully solve the sample matrix, two participants failed 
to mark “slightly agree” when requested, and two participants 
failed both attention checks. The resultant sample (N = 193) 
was 74% female and ranged in age from 18 to 36 (M = 20.69, 
SD = 2.10); 57% identified as Asian, 2.6% as African 
American or Black, 15.5% as Hispanic or Latino/Latina, 
                                                        
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
1.0% as Native American, Native Hawaiian, or Pacific 
Islander, 30.1% as White, and 7.8% as biracial.  
 
Design and Procedure 
 
Participants completed the study online. They read that 
researchers at their university were crowdsourcing the review 
of video recordings from a study conducted with students at 
their university during orientation week (i.e., toward the end 
of summer and before the start of the fall term). The logo of 
the participants’ university was in the corner of every page of 
the study. Ostensibly, the researchers conducted the study in 
many rooms simultaneously and were now seeking to 
identify any irregular behavior. As in Study 1, the people in 
the videos were asked to solve math matrices, and 
participants solved a sample matrix before watching the 
video. We manipulated the rank of each person of the video 
to create a 2 (First Actor Rank: high rank, low rank) × 2 
(Second Actor Rank: high rank, low rank) design. In all 
conditions, both actors stole money, and participants were 
instructed to evaluate the second actor. 
Rank Manipulation. Unlike Study 1, the rank 
manipulation was presented within the videos rather than in 
the instructions. We manipulated rank in the video with two 
types of cues. First, actors in the high rank conditions wore 
suits, and actors in the low rank conditions wore jeans and a 
t-shirt. Second, the videos all began with a “spontaneous” 
conversation between the two actors. The conversation began 
with a comment designed to draw attention to how the people 
in the video were dressed, which spurred a brief exchange 
that included information relevant to rank. In the three 
conditions where at least one of the actors was wearing a suit, 
the conversation began with, “You look sharp, man.” In the 
condition where both actors were low rank and dressed in t-
shirts, the conversation began with, “Did you see Chris in his 
suit today?” In all conditions, the dialogue explained that the 
people in suits had been team leaders during orientation 
week, were graduating soon, and had job interviews that day, 
whereas people in t-shirts were new to campus and would not 
be graduating soon. 
 
Measures 
  
All measures included in the study are reported below. 
Punishment. Punishment for the second actor was 
measured the same way as in Study 1. 
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Descriptive Norms. The four items from Study 3 
assessed participants’ perceptions of the descriptive norms, 
except the words “organization” and “company” were 
replaced with “university”. Participants responded on 7-point 
scales that ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly 
agree. Responses were averaged for analysis (α = .86).  
Attributions of Blame. Six items assessed blame for the 
second actor’s behavior by asking participants how much 
they agreed with the following statements: (1) It is 
completely the [second actor’s] fault that he/she did 
something wrong; (2) The [second actor] is solely to blame 
for his/her behavior; (3) The [second actor] is fully 
responsible for his/her actions; (4) It is partly the fault of the 
[first actor] that the [second actor] did something wrong. (5) 
The [first actor] deserves some of the blame for the behavior 
of the [second actor]; (6) The [first actor] is partially 
responsible for the behavior of the [second actor]. 
Participants responded on 7-point scales that ranged from 1 = 
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. Exploratory factor 
analysis with an oblique rotation assessed the extent to which 
the items that asked about blame for the second actor’s 
transgression were related; that is, it tested whether people 
tended to blame the second actor less when they blamed the 
first actor (and vice versa). Unlike Study 3, the analysis 
yielded a two factor solution: Items 1 – 3 loaded together on 
one factor (α = .90), and items 4 – 6 loaded together on a 
second factor (α = .92), and indicated that blame for the two 
actors were distinct but related constructs (r = -.51). To fully 
explore potential differences in how blame for the first and 
second actor operated in the imitation effect, we used 
separate indices of blame in analyses.  
 
Results 
 
Manipulation Check. Three items at the end of the study 
asked participant to compare the first and second actors in 
terms of rank, status, and seniority. Participants responded on 
7-point bipolar scales with higher scores indicating that the 
first actor was higher ranking (α = .86). A 2 (First Actor 
Rank: high rank, low rank) × 2 (Second Actor Rank: high 
rank, low rank) ANOVA found a significant main effect of 
first actor rank, F(1, 187) = 14.16, p < .001, η2p = .07. 
                                                        
6 The simple effect of second actor rank was not significant when the first 
actor was high ranking, F(1, 189) = 0.76, p = .39, η2p = .00. Participants 
punished the second actor the same amount, regardless of whether he and 
the first actor both were high ranking or when he was lower ranking than 
the first actor. On the one hand, this result suggests that only the first 
actor’s rank, not the difference in ranks between the actors, drives the 
imitation effect when the first actor is high ranking. On the other hand, 
comparisons between these conditions may be problematic because people 
Participants perceived the first actor as higher ranking in the 
high (M = 4.48, SD = 0.95) than low rank conditions (M = 
4.02, SD = 1.08). The main effect of second actor rank also 
was significant, F(1, 187) = 61.95, p < .001, η2p = .25. 
Participants perceived the second actor as higher ranking in 
the high (M = 4.74, SD = 0.85) than low rank conditions (M 
= 3.74, SD = 0.98). The interaction of the two manipulations 
was not significant, F(1, 187) = 1.98, p = .16, η2p = .01. 
Punishment. A 2 (First Actor Rank: high rank, low rank) 
× 2 (Second Actor Rank: high rank, low rank) ANOVA with 
punishment as the dependent variable indicated that the main 
effect of first actor rank was significant, F(1, 189) = 5.40, p 
= .02, η2p = .03. Punishment for the second actor was less 
severe when the first actor was high (M = 4.22, SD = 4.16) 
rather than low rank (M = 5.76, SD = 4.93). The main effect 
of second actor rank was not significant, F(1, 189) = 0.05, p 
= .82, η2p = .00. The interaction of first and second actor rank 
also was not significant, F(1, 189) = 2.15, p = .14, η2p = .01 
(see Figure 5). 
Hypothesis 1b pertains to low-ranking second actors. 
Therefore, we examined the simple effect of first actor rank 
within the low-ranking second actor conditions. In support of 
Hypothesis 1b, the imitation effect was significant when the 
second actor was low rank, F(1, 189) = 7.22, p = .008, η2p = 
.04. Participants punished the low-ranking second actor less 
severely when he imitated a higher-ranking actor (M = 3.81, 
SD = 4.24) compared to when he imitated a peer (M = 6.30, 
SD = 5.15). We also conducted an exploratory test of how 
people punish high-ranking imitators by comparing 
punishment for a high-ranking second actor who either 
imitated a (high-ranking) peer or someone lower in rank. In 
this situation, the imitation effect was not significant, F(1, 
189) = 0.36, p = .55, η2p = .00. Participants punished the high-
ranking second actor the same amount, regardless of whether 
he imitated a similarly high-ranking actor (M = 5.19, SD = 
4.67) or a lower-ranking first actor (M = 4.63, SD = 4.09). In 
short, the results of Study 4 again provide strong support for 
Hypothesis 1b. Results also suggested that a high-ranking 
first actor’s transgression does not reduce punishment for a 
similarly high-ranking imitator, but we discuss the balance of 
evidence for this claim in the discussion section below.6 
 
are known to perceive and respond to behavior differently as a function of 
the actor’s rank (e.g., Becker, 1963; Hollander, 1958; Polman, Pettit, & 
Wiesenfeld, 2013; Riordan et al., 1983). Therefore, it is ambiguous whether 
the absence of a difference between these conditions reflects (a) the 
presence of the imitation effect in both conditions, (b) an imitation effect 
when the second actor is low ranking and less propensity to punish when 
the second actor is high ranking, or (c) some combination of the imitation 
effect and less propensity to punish the high ranking second actor.  
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Figure 5: The effects of left and right actor rank on punishment in Study 4 
 
Tests of Mediation 
 
Estimation of Indirect Effects. We hypothesized that 
descriptive norms and attributions of blame would mediate 
the rank-dependent imitation effect on punishment. As with 
our tests of Hypothesis 1b, our tests of Hypotheses 2a-c 
focused on the low-ranking second actor conditions because 
these were the only conditions that pertain directly to our 
hypotheses (i.e., the only conditions that allow us to compare 
the effect of imitating a peer versus a higher-ranked other). 
However, we also wanted to explore whether imitation of a 
peer vs. a lower-ranked other affected blame for the second 
actor. Therefore, we planned to conduct analyses of mediated 
moderation that tested the indirect effect of first actor rank on 
punishment through blame depending on whether the second 
actor was low rank or high rank, but preliminary analyses 
indicated that attributions of blame—but not descriptive 
norms—differed as a function of the rank of the two actors 
(see supplemental information for details). As a result, we 
report analyses below that focus on the role of blame for the 
first and second actors (see Figure 6a). 
We conducted separate analyses for each index of blame 
because the factor analysis we reported above indicated that 
blame for the first and second actors were partially 
dependent. Models that include multiple mediators 
simultaneously estimate the indirect effect through each 
mediator controlling for other mediators in the model (Hayes, 
2013); therefore, multiple mediator models are useful for 
estimating the unique contribution of each mediator, but they 
underrepresent the total contribution of each mediator. Given 
that we are interested in whether people shift blame from the 
second actor to the first, our research question is more closely 
related to the total indirect effect through each mediator (as 
opposed to unique indirect effects). 
Bootstrapping procedures with 1000 bootstrap samples 
separately estimated the size of the indirect effects of first 
actor rank on punishment through blame as a function of 
whether the second actor was high or low rank (Hayes, 2013). 
In the model that included first actor blame as the mediator 
(see Figure 6b), the indirect effect was significant when the 
second actor was low rank, βc’ = -0.81 (confidence interval: -
1.75, -0.24), z = -2.36, p = .02, and only marginally 
significant when the second actor was high rank, βc’ = -0.57 
(confidence interval: -1.32, -0.05), z = -1.77, p = .08. In the 
model that included second actor blame as the mediator (see 
Figure 6c), the indirect effect was significant when the 
second actor was low rank, βc’ = -1.06 (confidence interval: -
2.41, -0.20), z = -2.10, p = .04, but not significant when the 
second actor was high rank, βc’ = -0.81 (confidence interval: 
-1.83, 0.13), z = -1.60, p = .11. In sum, the results provided 
further support for Hypothesis 2a but no support for 
Hypotheses 2b or 2c. 
 
Discussion 
 
Study 4 replicated the rank-dependent imitation effect 
and supported Hypothesis 1b using a new set of videos and a 
new rank manipulation. Study 4 also provided additional tests 
of the mechanisms responsible for the rank-dependent 
imitation effect. As in Study 3, we found robust evidence that 
attributions of blame mediated the imitation effect, which 
supports Hypothesis 2a. However, we found no evidence for 
Hypothesis 2b or 2c. Descriptive norms were unaffected by 
the rank of the actors in Study 4 and did not contribute 
significantly to any indirect effects in statistical tests of 
mediation. Although speculative, one potential explanation 
for the absence of change in descriptive norms is because 
participants in Study 4 observed transgressions in a familiar 
situation within their own organization and likely had a well-
developed sense of the descriptive norms for behavior. In 
other words, the behavior high-ranking individuals may not 
necessarily be sufficient to affect perceived descriptive 
norms. Nevertheless, the high-ranking individuals’ behavior 
may still influence attributions of blame and affect 
punishment (as was also indicated in Study 3 by the strong 
direct effect of transgression similarity on blame that was 
independent of the indirect effect through descriptive norms). 
Taken together, the combined results of Studies 3 and 4 
suggest that attributions of blame play a central role in the  
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Figures 6a-c: Conceptual and statistical models of the effects of first and second actor rank on punishment through blame for the first or second actor in 
Study 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rank-dependent imitation effect. Changes in perceived 
descriptive norms can, at least in some instances, also 
contribute to the rank-dependent imitation effect by 
influencing attributions of blame. However, changes in 
perceived descriptive norms are neither necessary nor 
sufficient to produce the rank-dependent imitation effect.  
Study 4 also included an exploratory condition in which 
we were able to compare punishment of high ranking 
individuals when they imitated either a high-ranking peer or 
someone lower-ranking. Results were somewhat mixed. On 
the one hand, the main effect of first actor rank was 
significant, and the interaction of first and second actor rank 
was not significant. These results suggest that first actor rank 
was sufficient to induce an imitation effect. On the other 
hand, the most direct test (the simple effect with the high-
ranking second actor condition) found no evidence of the 
imitation effect when the second actor was high rank; people 
punished the high ranking second actor the same amount, 
Figure 6a 
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regardless of whether he imitated a high or low ranking first 
actor. Moreover, the logic of including this condition was 
founded on the notion that high-ranking individuals may 
establish descriptive norms for behaviors regardless of who 
may be imitating them, but we found no evidence in this 
study that descriptive norms were driving the effect. Taken 
together, our exploratory analyses here indicate that the 
imitation effect is robust when the second actor is low rank 
but it may be much less pronounced (and perhaps absent) 
when the second actor is high rank.  
 
STUDY 5 
 
Study 5 explored another boundary condition of the 
rank-dependent imitation effect to help identify interventions 
that can eliminate the effect. Studies 3 and 4 indicate that the 
first actor’s behavior can serve as an excuse or justification 
for the second transgression and mitigate blame and 
punishment for the imitator. We expect that clear information 
that the first actor was punished for the initial transgression 
should eliminate the potential to view the first actor’s 
behavior as an excuse or justification. Therefore, Study 5 
manipulated the rank of the first actor and information about 
whether the first actor was punished. We expected that 
observers would recommend less severe punishment when a 
transgressor imitated a higher rather than same rank person 
and punishment for the first actor was ambiguous. However, 
punishment would be high, regardless of rank, when it was 
clear that the first actor was punished.  
 
Participants 
 
Two hundred Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers earned 
$1.00 to complete the study. All were residents of the United 
States. We excluded data from 13 respondents who failed one 
or both attention checks: (1) “To indicate you are reading 
carefully, please mark slightly agree.” (2) Participants spent 
less than seven seconds on the page that presented the 
scenario (i.e., we excluded people who spent less than 1/10th 
of the average time; Mean = 72.3 seconds; Median = 56.2 
seconds). The resultant sample (N = 187) was 46% female, 
and ranged in age from 18 to 72 (M = 33.83, SD = 10.25); 
79.7% identified as White, 8.0% as African American or 
Black, 7.5% as Asian, 4.8% as Hispanic or Latino/Latina, and 
1.1% as Native American, Native Hawaiian, or Pacific 
Islander. Nearly all had more than one year of full-time work 
experience (97.3%), including 45.7% who had more than 11 
years of experience. 
 
Design and Procedure 
 
The experiment was a 2 (First Actor Rank: higher rank, 
same rank) x 2 (Punishment Information: present, absent) 
between-subjects design, which was embedded in the 
expense report vignette used in Studies 2 and 3. All measures 
included in the study are reported below. 
First Actor Rank Manipulation. Participants in the 
higher rank condition read that the first actor was as a Vice 
President. Participants in the same rank condition read that 
the first actor was a junior analyst. The second actor was a 
junior analyst across all conditions. 
Punishment Information. The vignette varied 
information about whether the first actor was punished. In the 
punishment information present condition, participants read 
that the second actor heard from his coworkers that the 
company disciplined the first actor for misrepresenting the 
purpose of the expenses on the expense report. Participants in 
the punishment information absent condition read no 
information about whether the first actor was punished.  
Punishment Severity. Study 5 used the three items from 
Studies 2 and 3 (α = .97). 
Descriptive Norms. Study 5 used the four items from 
Study 3 (α = .93). 
Attributions of Blame. Study 5 used the five items from 
Study 3. Exploratory factor analysis with an oblique rotation 
assessed the extent to which the items that asked about blame 
for the second actor’s transgression were related. As in Study 
3, the analysis yielded a one factor solution, which indicates 
that the five items were strongly related. Therefore, we used 
a single index of blame based on the average of the five items 
after reverse scoring items 4 – 5 (α = .86).  
 
Results 
 
Manipulation Check. Four items at the end of the study 
assessed whether participants perceived the rank 
manipulation as intended. Participants indicated “how 
prestigious” and “how high in status” the junior analyst (α = 
.93) and Vice President (α = .93) jobs were using 7-point 
scales that ranged from 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely. A 
repeated measures ANOVA confirmed that participants 
perceived Vice Presidents (M = 6.47, SD = 0.62) as higher in 
rank than junior analysts (M = 3.54, SD = 1.29), F(1, 186) = 
893.28, p < .001, η2p = .83. 
Punishment. A 2 (First Actor Rank: higher rank, same 
rank) x 2 (Punishment Information: present, absent) ANOVA 
with punishment severity as the dependent variable indicated 
that the main effect for first actor rank was significant, F(1, 
Bauman et al., Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process (in press) 
 
183) = 14.22, p < .001, η2p = .07. Punishment for the second 
actor was less severe when the first actor was higher rank (M 
= 5.44, SD = 1.25) rather than the same rank as the second 
actor (M = 6.04, SD = 1.00). The main effect for punishment 
information also was significant, F(1, 183) = 12.95, p < .001, 
η2p = .07. Punishment for the second actor was less severe 
when punishment information about the first actor was absent 
(M = 5.47, SD = 1.33) than present (M = 6.03, SD = 0.89). 
Additionally, the interaction of first actor rank and 
punishment information was significant, F(1, 183) = 4.81, p 
= .03, η2p = .03.  
 
Figure 7: The effects of punishment information and first actor rank on 
punishment severity in Study 5 
 
Analyses of simple effects investigated the effect of first 
actor rank when punishment information about the first actor 
was absent and present (see Figure 7). When punishment 
information about the first actor was absent, punishment for 
the second actor was less severe when the first actor was 
higher rank rather than the same rank, F(1, 183) = 17.52, p < 
.001, η2p = .09. When punishment information about the first 
actor was present, however, punishment for the second actor 
was the same, irrespective of whether the first actor was 
higher ranking or the same rank, F(1, 183) = 1.27, p = .26, 
η2p = .01. In short, clear punishment information about the 
first actor eliminated the rank-dependent imitation effect. 
Therefore, Study 5 provided further support for Hypothesis 
1b and also indicated that the rank-dependent imitation effect 
is contingent on ambiguity about the consequences for the 
first actor.7 
Estimation of Indirect Effects. Study 5 provided 
additional tests of whether blame and descriptive norms 
mediated the rank-dependent imitation effect on punishment. 
Preliminary analyses found a significant interaction of first 
actor rank and punishment information for attributions of 
blame, not descriptive norms (see supplemental information 
for details). Therefore, we focused on the role of blame. 
Specifically, a mediated moderation analysis used a 
bootstrapping procedure with 1000 bootstrap samples to 
estimate the size of the indirect effects of first actor rank on 
punishment through blame as a function of whether 
punishment information was present or absent (see Figure 
8a). When punishment information was absent, the indirect 
effect was significant, βc’ = -0.55 (confidence interval: -0.94, 
-0.24), z = -3.81, p < .001. When punishment information was 
present, however, the indirect effect was not significant, βc’ = 
-0.17 (confidence interval: -0.39, 0.02), z = -1.27, p = .20. 
The non-significant indirect effect when punishment 
information as present is not surprising given that the direct 
effect was not significant in the first place. In sum, the results 
provided further support for Hypothesis 2a but no support for 
Hypothesis 2b. 
 
Discussion 
 
Study 5 replicated the rank-dependent imitation effect 
once again, but it also identified an important boundary 
condition of the effect: The rank-dependent imitation effect 
can be eliminated by clearly communicating that the first 
person to commit a transgression was punished. Study 5 also 
provided further evidence that blame, not descriptive norms, 
is the primary mechanism responsible for the imitation effect. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Negative social consequences (e.g., loss of respect, 
stigma, ostracism) that peers can impose on transgressors are 
a major deterrent of unethical behavior (e.g., Hollinger & 
Clark, 1982; Tittle, 1977; Tittle & Logan, 1973; Zimring & 
Hawkins, 1973). Employees’ inclination to punish 
coworkers’ misbehavior is also an integral part of peer 
 
                                                        
7 We also included an item at the end of the survey that asked whether the 
first actor was disciplined for misusing the credit card, which allowed us to 
test whether punishment severity for the second actor differed depending 
on whether participants believed that the first actor was unpunished or that 
punishment for the first actor was uncertain. Results indicated that the 
imitation effect existed both when people assumed the first actor went 
unpunished and when punishment for the first actor was uncertain. 
Therefore, results indicate that punishment must be explicit to mitigate the 
imitation effect. 
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Figures 8a-b: Conceptual and statistical models of the effects of first actor rank and punishment information on punishment through attributions of blame in 
Study 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
monitoring programs, which play an essential role in 
companies’ efforts to combat asset misappropriation 
(Association of Fraud Examiners, 2014; see also Weaver et 
al., 1999). However, employees’ views of transgressions 
reflect more than simple comparisons of behaviors and rules. 
In the current research, five studies examined behaviors that 
were unambiguously against an organization’s rules and 
found evidence of a rank-dependent imitation effect: people 
were relatively tolerant of unethical behavior when 
transgressors imitated someone who outranked them 
compared to when transgressors imitated a peer or committed 
a transgression no one else committed recently. However, the 
rank-dependent imitation effect only emerged when the two 
actors belonged to the same organization (Study 2), when 
there was a high degree of similarity between the behaviors 
committed by the two actors (Study 3), and in the absence of 
clear information about whether the instigator was punished 
(Study 5). Together, our findings indicate that people 
interpret and punish unethical behavior differently depending 
on whom, if anyone, has previously committed similar 
transgressions.  
To understand why the rank-dependent imitation effect 
exists, we examined whom people blamed for the second 
transgression and whether transgressions committed by high 
ranking individuals influenced observers’ perceptions of the 
descriptive norms for the behavior. Observers’ decisions 
about whether to blame the first or second actor for the 
second transgression consistently depended on the rank of the 
initial transgressor, and differences in attributions of blame 
affected punishment. Moreover, attributions of blame played 
a central role in the rank-dependent imitation effect in Studies 
3, 4, and 5, independent of any changes in descriptive norms. 
In contrast, the role of descriptive norms in the imitation 
effect appeared to be weaker, more ancillary, and may be 
conditional on the strength of observers’ prior beliefs about 
the norms for the behavior within the organization; Study 3 
suggested that descriptive norms can indirectly influenced 
punishment through blame, but we found no evidence that 
descriptive norms play a role in the rank-dependent imitation 
effect in Studies 4 and 5. Overall, we conclude that the rank-
dependent imitation effect emerges primarily due to how the 
initial transgressor’s rank influences whom people blame for 
the imitator’s behavior. 
Figure 8a 
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Our research extends theories of retributive justice and 
punishment by examining a downstream consequence of 
transgressions committed by high-ranking members of 
organizations. Prior research has mainly focused on relatively 
stable characteristics of transgressors and transgressions on 
punishment (e.g., Arvey & Jones, 1985; Darley & Pittman, 
2003; Fragale et al., 2009). For example, actors’ position in a 
hierarchy influences how much punishment they receive for 
a given offense (Feather, 1994; Fragale et al., 2009). 
However, our research suggests that important 
interrelationships exist between stable characteristics of 
transgressors (e.g., rank) and more fleeting features of 
situations (e.g., recent misconduct) when it comes to 
assigning blame and meting out punishment. In particular, 
our research suggests that “tall poppies” (i.e., high-ranking 
actors; Feather, 1994) who misbehave cast a shadow that can 
partially deflect blame and punishment for imitators. People 
may report schadenfreude, or pleasure in others’ misfortune 
when tall poppies fall from grace (cf. Feather, 2006), but we 
find they are especially sympathetic of lower-ranked actors 
who follow bad role models. Given that many approaches to 
resolve conflict and repair relationships are rooted in 
descriptive models of justice (e.g., Coleman, Deutsch, & 
Marcus, 2014; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2014; Skarlicki & Kulik, 
2004), it is important to identify special cases, such as 
imitation, that change the way people perceive rule violations 
and determine an appropriate amount of punishment for the 
offense. 
Our research also contributes to research on behavioral 
ethics and ethical contagion within organizations by showing 
how unethical behavior can change the environment in which 
subsequent behaviors take place. Behavioral ethics research 
traditionally has examined events through the lens of 
individual decision making and, accordingly, has 
conceptualized behavior as the terminus of a process. 
Although individual-level models of ethical decision making 
frequently acknowledge that others’ behavior has an 
important influence on (un)ethical behavior, relatively little 
attention has been given to articulating the processes and 
conditions under which one actor’s behavior affects others’ 
behavior. Social processes (e.g., group membership, identity, 
hierarchy, socialization) are especially influential in 
organizations (Brief & Smith-Crowe, 2016). Therefore, it is 
important to better understand the causal linkages across 
instances of unethical behavior, which often are 
underspecified in models of individuals’ ethical decision 
making. 
By exploring how observers respond to people who 
follow bad role models, our research adds a new perspective 
that complements recent research on how social learning 
processes influence ethical and unethical behavior in 
organizations. It is now well established that prior instances 
of unethical behavior can prompt others to misbehave (e.g., 
Brown et al., 2005; Mayer et al., 2009; Robinson & O’Leary-
Kelly, 1998; see also Bandura, 1986), but our research is the 
first to reveal that prior instances of unethical behavior can 
change observers’ interpretations and responses to 
subsequent transgressions; people are less apt to blame and 
more likely to pardon lower-ranked imitators. Moreover, the 
rank-dependent imitation effect may help create a 
psychological loophole that can perpetuate bad behavior in 
organizations. Specifically, bad role models appear to 
simultaneously disinhibit imitation and exonerate imitators. 
Given that punishment expectations directly influence ethical 
decision making and people’s propensity to engage in 
unethical behavior (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Treviño, 1986; 
Treviño & Youngblood, 1990), future research should 
investigate whether or how often imitators are aware that 
people are more lenient on imitators and use it in their 
calculus of when to act opportunistically. 
Our results also have implications for social learning 
theory because they suggest that there are some similarities 
and some differences in how modeling influences actors (i.e., 
second-party decisions about whether to imitate 
transgressions) and observers (i.e., third-party judgments of 
subsequent transgressions). One similarity is that ingroup 
membership is important to both second- and third-party 
judgment and behavior. Prior research on second-party 
judgment found that student participants in an experiment 
were more likely to misreport their performance to increase 
their economic outcome when someone else cheated first and 
was a student from their own school rather than from another 
school (Gino et al., 2009). Likewise, our research found that 
third-party judgment of imitation only emerges when the first 
transgressor and the imitator are from the same organization. 
However, rank appears to affect imitation differently across 
second- and third-party judgment. Specifically, prior research 
indicates that peer behavior affects second-party judgment 
and behavior (e.g., Gino et al., 2009; Robinson & O’Leary-
Kelly, 1998; Zey-Ferrell & Ferrell, 1982), whereas our 
research shows that third-party judgment is influenced less 
by behavior enacted by the imitators’ peers than by the 
imitators’ superiors. Therefore, a higher-ranking instigator or 
behavioral model appears to be a necessary condition for 
modeling to affect third-party (but not second-party) 
judgments about unethical behavior. 
Our research also has implications for the literature on 
whistleblowing. Prior research indicates that fear of 
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retaliation is a major concern that affects employees’ 
willingness to report unethical behavior, and both leaders and 
peers must have reputations for ethical behavior for fear of 
retaliation to be low (Mayer et al., 2013). In other words, 
ethical leadership on its own is insufficient to change 
reporting behavior; people need to feel supported by those in 
positions above and across from them in the organizational 
hierarchy to overcome barriers to reporting that are rooted in 
self-interest. Our results add to this story in two key ways. 
First, our results indicate that the behavior of other people in 
an organization affects the extent to which people blame 
actors for their offences. Thus, our studies suggest that 
modeling shifts the perceived root of the problem, which in 
turn changes the barriers to and the potential consequences of 
reporting the event. Second, our results indicate that 
punishment for imitators hinges on the prior behavior of 
higher-ranking actors, not peers, which differs from what 
Mayer et al. (2013) found for fear of retaliation. In other 
words, leader behavior on its own is sufficient to influence 
affect the amount of blame and punishment imitators receive. 
Taken together, the results of our studies and those of Mayer 
et al. combine to provide a clearer picture of when and how 
social information can interfere with employee monitoring 
processes. 
 
Limitations  
  
Our studies document the rank-dependent imitation 
effect in multiple samples, using different methods, and 
across various operationalizations of punishment. Taken 
together, the differences across the five experiments provide 
some evidence of the robustness of our results. However, one 
potential limitation of the current research is that all of the 
studies involve unethical behaviors of a somewhat limited 
scale (e.g., single instances of expense report fraud or 
equipment theft). Despite being unambiguously unethical, 
these behaviors are small enough that they do not have major 
repercussions for the company. Additionally or alternatively, 
people may be more willing to make situational attributions 
for discrete events such as these than for larger-scale or 
sustained unethical behavior (e.g., embezzling millions of 
dollars in company funds or repeated instances of fraud or 
theft). More severe cases of unethical conduct have greater 
moral intensity (Jones, 1991). Observers may therefore be 
more reluctant to make situational attributions for more 
severe behavior and feel that transgressors should be 
punished whether or not they imitated others. In sum, the 
scope of the rank-dependent imitation effect is unclear based 
on the current evidence, and future research should seek to 
establish boundary conditions of the effect in terms of the 
scale or sustained nature of the transgression.  
Another limitation is that our studies do not 
systematically examine the imitation effect across the many 
possible differences in rank that may exist between 
instigators and imitators. Future research could test whether 
imitating an immediate supervisor is different from imitating 
an even higher-ranked authority. The rank-dependent 
imitation effect may be stronger when people imitate an 
immediate than distant supervisor because immediate 
supervisors have more direct influence and more contact with 
the imitator. Results of Study 2 are generally supportive of 
the notion that observers are more likely to take prior 
transgressions into account when the first actor is proximate 
(in the same organization) rather than distant from the 
imitator (in a different organization). However, it is also 
possible that the rank-dependent imitation effect may be 
stronger when people imitate a distant than immediate 
supervisor because higher-ranking supervisors have more 
formal authority and higher status in the organization, which 
contributes to their perceived credibility as role models 
(Bandura, 1986; Brown et al., 2005). Future research could 
investigate these potential conditions of the rank-dependent 
imitation effect. 
Future research also should further investigate the 
potential role of descriptive norms in the imitation effect. In 
our studies, we observed changes in descriptive norms as a 
function of the first actor’s behavior in Study 3, but not in 
Studies 4 or 5, and it is not clear what accounted for the 
differences between studies. One possibility is that 
perceptions of descriptive norms are differently malleable 
across situations. Given that prior research indicates that 
descriptive norms can have powerful effects on the perceived 
permissibility of unethical behavior (Cialdini et al., 1990; 
Gino et al., 2009; Mayer et al., 2013; see also Moore & Gino, 
2013), it would be useful to better understand the conditions 
under which perceived descriptive norms are susceptible to 
influence.  
 
Practical Implications 
 
The current research indicates that high-ranking actors’ 
transgressions may absolve lower-ranking actors from blame 
and punishment for committing the same transgression. Any 
impunity for high-ranking actors’ transgressions may 
therefore represent an important impediment to the 
promotion of ethical behavior across organizational levels. 
Therefore, our findings underscore the importance of clearly 
and explicitly communicating that transgressors, especially 
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high-ranking transgressors, have been punished for any 
unethical actions. Notably, the results of Study 5 suggest that 
it is not necessary to provide extensive details about exactly 
how a transgressor was punished. It is sufficient to simply 
convey that the transgressor was held accountable, which 
suggests that it should be possible to eliminate the imitation 
effect without providing details that could trigger concerns 
about privacy or fairness (e.g., Treviño, 1992). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our research indicates that people are less apt to punish 
those who imitate bad behavior committed by higher-ranking 
members of the organization than those who imitate peers or 
commit transgressions no one else committed recently. 
Specifically, prior transgressions committed by high-ranking 
actors influence who observers blame when low-ranking 
members of the same organization imitate the transgression, 
and these shifts in blame, in turn, decrease punishment for 
imitators. Importantly, these results demonstrate how 
unethical behavior changes the environment in which 
subsequent behavior is enacted and evaluated, and highlight 
the need for more research to identify the processes and 
conditions. That is, future research should explore in greater 
detail the causal linkages across instances of unethical 
behavior in organizations, which have often been unspecified 
in models of individuals’ ethical decision making. 
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